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 provides an elegant, concise, and subtle elaboration and defense of the epistemic 
component of that conception of responsibility that would appear to underlie our everyday ascriptions of 
responsibility. It is by far the most thorough treatment of this topic of which I am aware. In the first section of 
this review, I will give an exposition of the highlights of Sher's discussion. In the second section, I will 
undertake a critical evaluation of this discussion. 
 
Part I 
The type of responsibility with which Sher is concerned is that which a person may bear for events that have 
occurred in the past. Such responsibility may be either moral or prudential and either positive or negative. 
Positive moral responsibility has to do with the praise that someone is due for having acted well in respect of 
doing what is morally right; negative moral responsibility has to do with the blame that someone is due for 
having done something morally wrong. Positive prudential responsibility has to do with the credit that someone 
is due for having acted successfully in the pursuit of some personally significant goal; negative prudential 
responsibility has to do with the criticism that someone is due for having acted foolishly. Sher focuses primarily 
on the negative aspect of responsibility, both moral and prudential, although in the end, he seeks a unified 
account of all four modes of responsibility. 
 
Ever since Aristotle, most philosophers who have investigated the matter of what it takes for a person to be 
responsible for some past event have drawn a distinction between two necessary conditions of responsibility, 
one having to do with that person's freedom of will or action, the other having to do with his awareness or 
understanding of the nature of what has occurred. Sher shares this approach, calling the first condition the 
voluntariness condition and the second the knowledge condition. (He does so with some misgivings, 
recognizing that the most plausible version of the first condition might only involve a type of ―origination‖ that 
falls short of voluntariness, and that the most plausible version of the second condition might only involve a 
type of epistemic state that falls short of knowledge.) As noted above, it is on giving a detailed account of the 
second condition that Sher focuses his efforts. Like most philosophers, Sher also assumes that a person may be 
responsible not only for the acts that he has performed, but also for the omissions that he has allowed, and, 
moreover, for the outcomes of his acts and omissions. For the sake of brevity, however, he tends to write 
exclusively of responsibility for acts, but he always has omissions and outcomes also in mind. Since he 
subscribes to a coarse-grained approach to event-individuation, he sometimes writes more particularly of 
responsibility for those features of acts (or omissions or outcomes) that serve to render them right or wrong, 
prudent or foolish. 
 
In order to motivate his own account of the epistemic condition of responsibility, Sher takes as his foil a rival 
account that he calls the searchlight view, according to which a person's responsibility for an act (or omission or 
outcome) extends only to those features of the act of which he was aware—those features that were 
―illuminated by the searchlight of his consciousness‖ when he performed the act. He says that this view is both 
―popular‖ and ―pervasive‖ (p. 9) but problematic. While he has no quarrel with the claim that one can indeed be 
responsible for those features of one's act of which, at the time of its performance, one was aware, he notes that 
the claim that one can be responsible only for such features would appear to conflict with many everyday 
judgments, according to which responsibility is to be ascribed less restrictively. To show this, Sher presents a 
set of nine cases that can roughly be divided into three subsets, one having to do with involuntary lapses of 
judgment, the second with poor judgment, and the third with lack of moral insight. Here are representative cases 
from each subset (pp. 24, 26, and 28): 
 
Hot Dog. Alessandra, a soccer mom, has gone to pick up her children at their elementary school. As 
usual, Alessandra is accompanied by the family's border collie, Bathsheba, who rides in the back of the 
van. Although it is very hot, the pick-up has never taken long, so Alessandra leaves Sheba in the van 
while she goes to gather her children. This time, however, Alessandra is greeted by a tangled tale of 
misbehavior, ill-considered punishment, and administrative bungling which requires several hours of 
indignant sorting out. During that time, Sheba languishes, forgotten, in the locked car. When Alessandra 
and her children finally make it to the parking lot, they find Sheba unconscious from heat prostration. 
 
Colicky Baby. Scout, a young woman of twenty-three, has been left in charge of her sister's baby. The 
infant is experiencing digestive pains and has cried steadily for hours. Scout has made various attempts 
to ease its discomfort, but nothing has worked. Finally, to make the child sleep, she mixes vodka with its 
fruit juice. The child is rushed to the hospital with alcohol poisoning. 
 
Bad Weather. It is 1968, and amerika (a nom de guerre) is a member of the Weather Underground. 
Sensitive and conscientious as a child, amerika has been rethinking his moral beliefs. In a series of 
stages, he has become convinced, first, that capitalism is deeply unjust; next, that nothing short of 
revolution will bring change; and, finally, that the need to rectify massive injustice far outweighs the 
rights or interests of mere individuals. To procure funds for the Revolution, amerika takes part in a 
robbery in which a bank guard is killed. 
 
In each of these cases, Sher says, ―the agent would definitely be blamed and might well be liable to 
punishment‖ (p. 24), despite being unaware of the wrongness of her or his behavior. This seems to me 
absolutely right as a description of the sort of reaction that the agent can expect to receive in response to what 
she or he has done. (Sher also notes that there are permutations on these cases in which the agent acts foolishly, 
rather than wrongly, and can expect to be held prudentially, rather than morally, responsible.) Since the 
searchlight view implies that the agent is responsible in none of these cases, it is clear that it clashes with many 
of our everyday judgments. So what are we to do: reject the searchlight view, or reject our everyday judgments? 
As Sher says, we should take the latter tack only if a case can be made for the searchlight view that is stronger 
than the case for retaining our current judgments. He believes that this cannot be done. 
 
It might be thought that the conflict between the searchlight view and our everyday judgments has been 
overstated, in that a qualified version of the searchlight view could accommodate these judgments after all. 
Some philosophers have subscribed, not to the searchlight view as formulated above, but to the following 
position: a person's responsibility for an act extends only to those features of the act of which he is aware, 
unless his lack of awareness of these features is a consequence of some other act of whose features he was 
aware. The idea here is that, contrary to what the searchlight view in its original formulation says, it is possible 
after all to be negatively responsible for ignorant behavior, as long as one's ignorance can be traced to behavior 
of whose wrongness or foolishness one was not ignorant. But, as Sher rightly says, this qualified view affords 
no effective compromise in the present context, since there is no reason to believe that the agent's ignorance in 
the cases that have been cited can be traced to any such nonignorant origin, and yet the agent can still expect to 
be blamed and perhaps also punished nonetheless. 
 
So, what case might be made for the searchlight view, qualified or unqualified? Here, Sher says, one must 
engage in some ―imaginative reconstruction,‖ since advocates of the searchlight view have afforded it 
―strikingly little direct attention‖ (p. 41). He entertains two routes to the searchlight view that he finds suggested 
in the writings of some of its proponents. One route, which he mines from some writings of Christine Korsgaard 
and Hilary Bok, concerns the idea that responsibility is a ―practical concept‖ that plays a role only in the context 
of an agent's deliberations about what to do; since an agent can only deliberate about that of which he is aware, 
his responsibility extends only to that of which he is aware. Sher rejects this argument on the grounds that 
whereas deliberation is exclusively future-oriented and first-personal, ascriptions of responsibility are neither, 
and so it is not true that the concept of responsibility plays a role only in the context of practical deliberation. 
The other route to the searchlight view that Sher discusses concerns the idea that it is unfair to hold someone 
responsible for what is not in his control, and a person cannot control what he does not foresee. To this he 
responds that although it may in a way be unreasonable to expect someone to respond to reasons of which he is 
unaware, it does not follow that he does not have these reasons. Moreover, agents in fact can be and often are 
responsive to reasons of which they are unaware. This being the case, it can be perfectly fair to hold agents 
responsible for failing to do what they had most reason to do, even if they were unaware that they had most 
reason to do it. Sher concedes that this conclusion threatens the idea that responsibility requires control, a matter 
to which he returns later. 
 
Given the dearth of persuasive arguments for the searchlight view, and given its incompatibility with many of 
our everyday judgments of responsibility, the search is now on for an alternative view of responsibility that can 
better accommodate these judgments. Sher turns first to the common and plausible idea that even if the agents 
in the sorts of cases he cites did not know that they were doing anything wrong, they can properly be held 
responsible for their behavior because they should have known this. Each of Alessandra, Scout, and amerika 
should have realized that she or he was wrongly putting the well-being of some innocent animal or person at 
serious risk, and thus each may be held responsible for having done so; the violation of some applicable 
standard regarding what they should have been aware of suffices, under the circumstances, for their being 
responsible for their behavior, even though they were unaware of the violation. Sher rejects this proposal, 
saying (pp. 81–2): 
 
[A]nyone who acts wrongly or foolishly is of necessity already violating one moral or prudential 
standard—namely, the standard with reference to which his act is wrong or foolish. Because what we are 
trying to understand is precisely how such an agent can be responsible for acting wrongly or foolishly 
despite not being aware of violating this standard, the mere fact that he is violating it is evidently not 
sufficient to establish his responsibility. However, if the agent's unrecognized violation of the original 
standard is not sufficient to tie him closely enough to his act's wrongness or foolishness to render him 
responsible for it, then why should his equally unrecognized violation of any further moral or prudential 
or epistemic standard tie him any more closely to it? . . . [I]f it is problematic to hold someone 
responsible for violating a standard of morality or prudence whose applicability to his situation he has 
failed to recognize, then it will hardly help matters to add that his failure to recognize that standard's 
applicability also places him in violation of a further standard, this time one which dictates 
responsiveness to epistemic reasons, whose applicability to his situation he has also failed to recognize. 
 
So far, then, Sher has in effect argued against three theses, which can be put as follows: 
 
(A) Someone is negatively responsible for some act if and only if 
(1) he satisfies any non-epistemic condition necessary for such responsibility; and 
(2) he was aware of the act's wrongness or foolishness. 
(B) Someone is negatively responsible for some act if and only if 
(1) he satisfies any non-epistemic condition necessary for such responsibility; and 
(2) either (a) he was aware of the act's wrongness or foolishness or (b) he was unaware of the 
act's wrongness or foolishness and this unawareness was a consequence of some other act of 
whose wrongness or foolishness he was aware. 
(C) Someone is negatively responsible for some act if and only if 
(1) he satisfies any non-epistemic condition necessary for such responsibility; and 
(2) either (a) he was aware of the act's wrongness or foolishness or (b) he should have been 
aware of the act's wrongness or foolishness. 
 
In the case of Theses A and B, Sher objects to the ―only if‖ part of the thesis but not the ―if‖ part; in the case of 
Thesis C, he objects to the ―if‖ part but not the ―only if‖ part. What he seeks to do therefore is not to dismiss 
these theses wholesale, but rather to supplement them in such a way that the epistemic condition for negative 
responsibility is fully and properly accounted for. In his pursuit of this goal, Sher briefly considers another view 
of responsibility, one that has recently gained prominence and which is opposed to the searchlight view. This is 
the view that has come to be called attributionism. Advocated by Thomas Scanlon and Angela Smith, among 
others, it is the view that we can be responsible not just for acts but also for attitudes such as beliefs, desires, 
and emotions, even if we are unaware of the wrongness or foolishness of these acts and attitudes, as long as they 
reflect our rational judgments in such a way that it is appropriate, at least in principle, to ask us to defend them. 
It is the ability to make rational judgments that constitutes someone as a responsible person, and it is the 
particular contents of such judgments that are to be attributed to a particular person and which make him the 
responsible person he is. 
 
Sher declares attributionism, like the other views he has considered, unacceptable, not because he believes it to 
be wholly misguided, but rather because he finds once again that it is unable to accommodate the full range of 
our everyday judgments of responsibility. Consider Alessandra. The time that she spends dealing with the 
problems at her children's school does indeed reflect her judgment that she has good reason to do just that, but 
what makes her behavior wrong—the fact that she is thereby neglecting the family pet—plays no role in 
forming this judgment. What Sher finds wanting in attributionism, and in all the other views he has discussed, is 
the key idea that a person can indeed be responsible for behavior of whose wrongness or foolishness he was 
unaware, as long as his lack of awareness is to be explained in terms of those attitudes, dispositions, and traits 
(many of them unconscious) that are constitutive of him and which render him capable of both recognizing and 
discharging the sort of moral or prudential duty that he in fact failed to discharge. The partial account of the 
epistemic condition of responsibility (partial, because it only deals with negative responsibility) that Sher ends 
up endorsing, then, is this (p. 88): 
 
When someone performs a wrong or foolish act in a way that satisfies the voluntariness condition, and 
when he also satisfies any other conditions for responsibility that are independent of the epistemic 
condition, he is responsible for his act's wrongness or foolishness if, but only if, he either  
(1) is aware that the act is wrong or foolish when he performs it, or else  
(2) is unaware that the act is wrong or foolish despite having evidence for its wrongness or 
foolishness his failure to recognize which 
(a) falls below some applicable standard, and 
(b) is caused by the interaction of some combination of his constitutive attitudes, 
dispositions, and traits. 
 
In a brief discussion at the end of the book, Sher addresses the issue of positive responsibility. The full account 
of the epistemic condition of responsibility that emerges is this (p. 143): 
 
When someone performs an act in a way that satisfies the voluntariness condition, and when he also 
satisfies any other conditions for responsibility that are independent of the epistemic condition, he is 
responsible for his act's morally or prudentially relevant feature if, but only if, he either  
(1) is consciously aware that the act has that feature (i.e., is wrong or foolish or right or prudent) 
when he performs it, or else  
(2) is unaware that the act is wrong or foolish despite having evidence for its wrongness or 
foolishness his failure to recognize which   
(a) falls below some applicable standard, and   
(b) is caused by the interaction of some combination of his constitutive attitudes, 
dispositions, and traits, or else  
(3) is unaware that the act is right or prudent despite having made enough cognitive contact with 
the evidence for its rightness or prudence to enable him to perform the act on that basis. 
 
The final issue that Sher addresses is the relation between responsibility and control. He grants that if we 
understand control (as he himself is inclined to do) as requiring awareness of one's options, then on his account 
responsibility does not require control. But this does not mean that there is no voluntariness condition that is 
necessary for responsibility along with the epistemic condition that he has sought to elucidate. On the contrary, 
as his account of the epistemic condition itself attests, behavior for which a person is responsible must originate 
in the constitutive features of that person. Just how to account fully for this origination relation is a task that 
Sher does not undertake. He is content to note that his account of the epistemic condition is consistent with a 
variety of approaches, whether compatibilist or incompatibilist, that invoke such considerations as a person's 
character, his responsiveness to reasons, the absence of coercion or compulsion, or indeed the absence of any 
causally sufficient condition whatsoever. 
 
Part II 
There is much to admire in Sher's discussion of responsibility. His defense of his own view is thoughtful and 
thorough, and his criticism of the views of others is in many instances subtle and astute. Moreover, there is no 
doubt that he is right to say that the common conception of responsibility is one according to which agents in 
such cases as Hot Dog, Colicky Baby, and the rest are responsible for their behavior. (By ―the common 
conception of responsibility,‖ I mean the understanding of responsibility that appears to underlie the everyday 
judgments of the general populace. I do not presume that this conception is coherent. On the contrary, I will 
give reasons for thinking that our everyday moral judgments are in many cases at odds with certain 
presuppositions about responsibility to which most of us do, and all of us should, subscribe.) Sher's account of 
the epistemic condition of responsibility would appear to capture this conception well, certainly better than any 
other account that I know of. Nonetheless, I reject his account. In this section, I will try to explain why. 
 
First, let me note two points in Sher's favor. The first is that the searchlight view, whether unqualified as in 
Thesis A above or qualified as in Thesis B, certainly does not accommodate the full range of our everyday 
judgments of responsibility. The cases that Sher gives—Hot Dog and the rest—amply demonstrate this fact. 
The second point is that Sher is certainly right to dismiss Thesis C, the simple ―knew or should have known‖ 
thesis, even though it is this thesis to which, I believe, many people appeal, whether explicitly or implicitly, 
when rendering their judgments in cases such as Hot Dog. It has always puzzled me why anyone should think 
Thesis C acceptable. After all, as Sher in effect says in the passage I quoted above, those who appeal to it 
acknowledge that one can have an excuse for wrongdoing and hence that wrongdoing does not suffice for 
blameworthiness. One kind of excuse that is frequently tendered is the excuse of ignorance. To accept this 
excuse in some circumstances but dismiss it in others, simply on the basis that, in the latter circumstances, the 
person in question should have known what he did not know, is bizarre; for this neglects the possibility that one 
has an excuse for not doing (or knowing) what one should have done (or known), the very possibility that gives 
rise to the question of how one can be to blame for ignorant wrongdoing in the first place! It is to Sher's credit 
that he clearly recognizes and exposes this problem with Thesis C. 
 
Before I turn to my reason for rejecting Sher's account, let me raise two minor quibbles. The first concerns his 
characterization of the searchlight view as both popular and pervasive. This strikes me as at best misleading. I 
am not sure whether anyone has ever accepted the unqualified version of the view expressed in Thesis A. 
Certainly some philosophers, of whom I am one, have endorsed the qualified view expressed in Thesis B, but 
my impression is that we are decidedly in the minority among philosophers, let alone among the general 
populace, regarding what it takes for someone to be responsible for something, precisely because the view rules 
out responsibility in such cases as Hot Dog. 
 
My second quibble concerns Sher's rejection of the thesis that responsibility requires control. He does so for the 
reason given above, namely, that control requires an awareness of one's options, whereas responsibility does 
not. But here I think he moves too quickly over some difficult terrain. Even if it is true, as Sher says, that ―an 
agent who does not realize that his act has a certain feature, or that it will issue in a certain outcome, can hardly 
be said to exercise control with respect to that feature or outcome‖ (p. 145), it nonetheless also seems true that 
some forms of control over an option do not require awareness of all pertinent features of that option, while 
others do not even require awareness of the option itself. Consider Alessandra, for example. She spent 
considerable time dealing with her children's problems, and wrongly so, since in so doing she unduly neglected 
the family pet. Was she in control of her behavior? Well, she was not aware of the wrongness of what she did, 
and so it may be (although in fact I have doubts about this) that, as Sher says, she did not exercise control with 
respect to that particular feature of her behavior. Nonetheless, she was, we may assume, perfectly aware of the 
fact that she was taking considerable time to deal with her children's problems, and so it seems quite reasonable 
to say that she was in control of her behavior in that regard. In his formal account of responsibility, Sher writes 
of someone's ―being responsible for his act's wrongness,‖ but in normal parlance, we tend to talk simply in 
terms of someone's ―being responsible for his act.‖ We would normally say, not that Alessandra is responsible 
for the wrongness of her taking so much time dealing with her children's problems, but simply that she is 
responsible for taking so much time to do so. Here there is no pressure to loosen the link between responsibility 
and control, since Alessandra was in control of that for which she is being held responsible. What of her neglect 
of the dog? We would normally say that she is responsible for that, too, but was it in her control? Well, certainly 
she was not aware of her neglect in the way in which she was aware of taking so much time dealing with her 
children's problems. Nonetheless, there is surely some respectable sense in which the neglect was in her control, 
since whether or not it would occur depended on what choice she would make. She did not choose to act 
wrongly, but she did choose, wrongly, to spend considerable time dealing with her children's problems, as a 
result of which she wrongly neglected the dog. She could have chosen, rightly, to spend less time on her 
children's problems, as a result of which she would not have unduly neglected the dog. The choice was up to 
her, and hence the neglect was too, even though there were aspects of her options, including but not limited to 
their moral status, of which she was unaware. Under the circumstances, then, it seems an exaggeration to say 
that Alessandra did not exercise a form of control that is relevant to, and perhaps necessary for, her being 
responsible for her behavior. Still, I will not press this point, since I suspect that Sher would in fact agree with 
what I have said, even if not with the terms in which I have said it. He is, after all, fully prepared to accept some 
form of ―voluntariness‖ condition on responsibility. 
 
Let me turn now to my reason for rejecting Sher's account of the epistemic condition of responsibility. I do so 
because, as indicated above, I subscribe to the qualified version of the searchlight view expressed in Thesis B. I 
subscribe to this thesis because I am persuaded by an argument that it is true. As noted in the last section, Sher 
claims that advocates of the searchlight view have paid little direct attention to defending it, and so he feels 
compelled to engage in some ―imaginative reconstruction‖ on their behalf. This is disappointing, in that I 
myself have provided an explicit argument for the view, and Sher is apparently acquainted with this argument, 
since on page 8 and elsewhere he cites the article in which it first appeared. In any case, let me now give this 
argument in the form in which I presented it in a recent book, where I discussed a case in which one person, 
Alf, mistreated another person, Brenda, but was ignorant at the time that his treatment of her was wrong. Here is 
what I said: 
 
Question: is Alf to blame for having [mistreated] Brenda, or does he have an excuse in virtue of his 
ignorance [of the fact] that his behavior was wrong? (That is: overall [as opposed to merely prima facie] 
morally wrong. This qualification will be implicit throughout . . .) Surely such ignorance does not 
always excuse one's behavior, since one may be culpable for one's ignorance. This is commonly 
acknowledged. What is not commonly acknowledged, though, is that culpability for such ignorance is 
rare. On the contrary, our common practice indicates that we think that such culpability is frequently 
incurred; for we often blame people for performing actions that were wrong (or that we take to have 
been wrong) on the grounds that, even if they didn't know that what they were doing was wrong, they 
should have known this. Many would say just this in Alf's case. I believe that this practice is misguided, 
however, and is itself likely to result in wrongdoing. 
 
Here is my argument. Call the item of behavior in question A, and grant that (1) Alf did A, A was wrong, 
but Alf was ignorant of this fact since, at the time he did A, he did not believe that it was wrong. Now 
(2) one is culpable for ignorant behavior only if one is culpable for the ignorance in or from which it was 
performed. Hence (3) Alf is culpable for having done A only if he is culpable for the ignorance in or 
from which he did A. However (4) one is culpable for something only if one was in control of that thing. 
Hence (5) Alf is culpable for having done A only if he was in control of the ignorance—in particular, the 
failure to believe that what he was doing was wrong—in or from which he did A. But (6) one is never 
directly in control of whether one believes or does not believe something; that is, any control that one 
has over one's beliefs and disbeliefs is only ever indirect. Moreover (7) if one is culpable for something 
over which one had merely indirect control, then one's culpability for it is itself merely indirect. 
Furthermore (8) one is indirectly culpable for something only if that thing was a consequence of 
something else for which one is directly culpable. Hence (9) Alf is culpable for having done A only if 
there was something else, B, for which he is directly culpable and of which the ignorance—the 
disbelief—in or from which he did A was a consequence. But (10) whatever B was, it cannot itself have 
been an instance of ignorant behavior, because then the argument would apply all over again to it; B 
must, then, have been some item of behavior, some act or omission of Alf's, that Alf believed at the time 
to be wrong. Hence (11) Alf is culpable for having done A only if there was some other act or omission, 
B, for which he is directly culpable and of which his failure to believe that A was wrong was a 
consequence, and B was such that Alf believed it at the time to be wrong. 
 
The picture that emerges is thus one of a chain of events or occurrences, each a consequence of its predecessors, 
at whose origin lies some item of behavior that Alf believed at the time to be overall wrong and for which he is 
directly culpable. Not at the origin, but lying somewhere further down the chain, are, first, the ignorance in or 
from which Alf did A and, second, Alf's performance of A. For these and other such items on the chain Alf is 
only indirectly culpable. We may call such a chain a chain of culpability. Now, Alf has, of course, been picked 
at random. What is true of him is also true of Brenda, Charles, Doris, Edward, and so on. We thus arrive at the 
following general thesis: 
 
The Origination Thesis: 
Every chain of culpability is such that at its origin lies an item of behavior for which the agent is directly 
culpable and which the agent believed, at the time at which the behavior occurred, to be overall morally 
wrong. 
 
As far as I can tell, ignorant behavior is rarely to be traced to a non-ignorant origin. It would be surprising, for 
example, to find any such episode of witting wrongdoing in Alf's history to which his [mistreatment] of Brenda 
can be traced. In the absence of any such episode, the Origination Thesis implies that Alf is not culpable for his 
ignorant behavior. And there is no reason to think that Alf is atypical in this respect. Thus the Origination 
Thesis implies that in general culpability for ignorant behavior is rare. This may be appropriately described as a 
deflationary conclusion, since it implies that our common practice of frequently blaming people such as Alf for 




I apologize for the length of this quotation, but the argument is fairly complex, and I know of no more succinct 
way to present it. 
 
Once such an argument has been given, it is, it seems to me, incumbent on anyone who wishes to defend the 
common view that people such as Alessandra are responsible for their behavior to identify precisely where they 
think the argument goes wrong. Since the argument is valid, there is only one way to do this: say which premise 
or premises are to be rejected, and why. In my book, I entertained reasons for rejecting each of premises (2) (4) 
(6), and (7) (but not [8], which I regard as analytic). I will not repeat here what I had to say there, but will 
simply note that (of course) I found none of the reasons persuasive. Perhaps I should have found some of them 
persuasive, or perhaps there are other more persuasive reasons that I failed to entertain. I will not pursue the 
matter here, other than to say that I cannot glean from what Sher says in his book just which premise or 
premises he would reject or why. It might at first seem that he would reject premise (4), according to which 
culpability requires control. But I hope it is clear that in this premise, I am invoking a sense of ―control‖ that is 
not so restrictive as to require advertence to the moral status of one's behavior, for that would beg the very 
question that the argument purports to answer. Understood in a less restrictive way, the premise is one that I 
believe Sher would accept, since, as noted earlier, he acknowledges a voluntariness condition on responsibility. 
 
I have characterized my argument as an argument for the qualified version of the searchlight view, but in fact 
this is not strictly accurate. According to what I have called the Origination Thesis (which, to be clear, concerns 
a kind of ―origination‖ quite distinct from that to which Sher refers, and which I mentioned in the last section, 
when he discusses the voluntariness condition), culpability must be rooted in a belief about wrongdoing, but the 
thesis itself does not require that this belief be a conscious or occurrent one. Nonetheless, I do go on in the book 
to say that, with one possible exception, it seems that the belief in question must indeed be occurrent, rather 
than merely dispositional. Here is what I had to say on the matter: 
 
With one possible exception [having to do with routine or habitual actions], if a belief is not occurrent, 
then one cannot act either with the intention to heed the belief or with the intention not to heed it; if one 
has no such intention, then one cannot act either deliberately on or deliberately despite the belief; if this 
is so, then the belief plays no role in the reason for which one performs one's action; and, I am inclined 
to think, one incurs culpability for one's action only if one's belief concerning wrongdoing plays a role in 




Perhaps Sher would find fault with this argument, too, but again I am not sure just where or why he would do 
so. 
 
There is still another reason, however, for distinguishing between the view for which I have argued and the 
(qualified) searchlight view as characterized by Sher, and that is that my view concerns only culpability, which 
I take to be the sort of negative moral responsibility that Sher has in mind when he writes of the blame that an 
agent may be due for doing something wrong. My view does not extend either to positive moral responsibility 
or to prudential responsibility, whether positive or negative. Indeed, it may even be a mistake to say that the 
culpability that my view concerns is equivalent to the sort of negative moral responsibility with which Sher is 
concerned. Perhaps Sher's target is broader, with culpability being only one of several kinds of negative moral 
responsibility of a sort for which he has sought to give an account. Let me explain. 
 
A connection is often drawn between responsibility and what have come to be called the reactive attitudes. 
Many philosophers hold that responsibility consists in, or is at least correlated with, the appropriateness of being 
the target of such attitudes and of practices, such as punishment, that incorporate such attitudes. I accept this 
general thesis. What is often left unexplored, however, is the fact that there are many attitudes and practices that 
qualify as ―reactive,‖ and that some of these attitudes and practices may be appropriate in some cases but not in 
others. This is evidence for the claim that there are different kinds of responsibility, even different kinds of 
moral responsibility.
4
 Elsewhere, I have called the sort of responsibility that grounds the fittingness of reactive 
attitudes ―appraisability,‖ of which I take laudability and culpability to be the positive and negative modes, 
respectively.
5 
Others use different terminology. Scanlon, for example, calls the sort of responsibility that 
grounds the fittingness of reactive attitudes ―attributability.‖ Now, as indicated in premise (4) of my argument 
above, I take freedom of will to be a necessary condition of appraisability, whereas Scanlon denies that freedom 
of will is a necessary condition of attributability.
6
 It may therefore appear that Scanlon and I are at odds with 
one another, but I am not sure that that is in fact the case. It may simply be that we are talking about two 
different kinds of moral evaluability in persons rather than differing about the conditions of one particular kind. 
Indeed, I am inclined to think that we are talking about two different kinds. 
 
Although the view that moral responsibility requires free will is very common, Scanlon is not the first to dispute 
it. Robert Adams, for example, contends that the graduate of the Hitler Jugend is to be blamed for his vile 
beliefs, no matter how he came by them;
7
 Eugene Schlossberger likewise holds that we may be praiseworthy or 
blameworthy for our commitment to certain moral values, regardless of whether they were freely chosen;
8 
and 
others have made similar claims. So when Scanlon suggests, for example, that a liar is not to be excused for 
lying just because she is incorrigible,
9
 he is not advancing a wholly new thesis. And, I want to say, it is a thesis 
we should accept, once its limitations have been recognized. 
 
In order to bring out these limitations, let me consider the case of a (purportedly) ―incorrigible‖nonliar. Mark 
Twain is reputed to have said: ―I am morally superior to George Washington. He couldn't tell a lie. I can and I 
don't.‖
10
 I believe that this witty remark contains a very important insight. Let us suppose, no doubt falsely, that 
Washington was speaking the literal truth, and that he was constitutionally incapable of telling a lie. We may 
certainly agree with Scanlon et al. that someone who cannot commit a certain form of wrongdoing warrants 
some form of moral recognition, but, as Twain points out, the kind of recognition that is warranted differs from 
that warranted by someone who can commit the wrongdoing but deliberately chooses not to do so. So, too, we 
may indeed say that the youthful Nazi is in some way reprehensible for the beliefs that he holds, but, I believe, 
he is not to be blamed for them in the same way as he would be if he had formed them as a result of free 
reflection. In brief, the kind of moral evaluation warranted by an unfree agent differs from that warranted by a 
free agent, and this has implications regarding the kind of reaction warranted. So too, I would say, the kind of 
moral evaluation warranted by such ignorant agents as Alessandra differs from that warranted by agents who 
consciously do wrong. In particular, the reaction of punishment is, I believe, deserved only when the agent has 
freely and consciously done wrong. If Scanlon agrees, then we are not, or may not be, at odds after all. The kind 
of agent evaluability that he has in mind when he talks of ―attributability‖ will not be exactly the same as that 
which I have in mind when I talk of ―appraisability.‖ 
 
There is a general lesson to be learned here. Many philosophers have proposed accounts of moral responsibility, 
and these accounts often differ in their details. Some writers hold that responsibility concerns the evaluation of 
an agent's character, whereas I do not. Some say that moral responsibility has to do with an agent's 
responsiveness to reasons, whereas I again do not. Some contend that responsibility is in part a function of 
authenticity, whereas once again I do not. Such examples can be multiplied indefinitely. The question arises 
whether these other philosophers and I disagree about the nature of moral responsibility. The general lesson is 
that we might be disagreeing with one another, but also we might not be; perhaps we are instead talking of 
different, though related, modes of moral evaluability. I suspect that whether this is so depends at least in part 
on whether we would agree or disagree about precisely which reactions are deserved by those whom we deem 
morally responsible for their behavior. If we agree about just which reactions are deserved, then that is a sign 
that we also agree about the kind and degree of moral evaluability at stake; if we disagree about the former, that 
is a sign that we also disagree about the latter. But the matter is not straightforward, since these signs are not 
infallible. That is, it would seem perfectly possible for two people to agree about the kind and degree of 
evaluability at stake but disagree about just what reactions are deserved, and also perfectly possible for two 
people to disagree about the former and yet agree about the latter. This being the case, the question of how to 
distinguish kinds and degrees of evaluability is complex. 
 
How do these observations pertain to the (apparent) differences between Sher and myself on the nature of 
responsibility? Well, they might pave the way to some type of compromise between us. Sher insists that 
Alessandra and the other protagonists in the cases he gives are responsible for their behavior, even though they 
were ignorant of the fact that they were doing anything wrong or foolish, and even though this ignorance cannot 
be traced to some nonignorant origin. I am prepared to accept this assessment (for present purposes, at least), as 
long as the particular form of responsibility that is ascribed to these agents is not that which is correlated with 
their being deserving of the particular reaction of punishment. Sher says that Alessandra and the rest ―would 
definitely be blamed and might well be liable to punishment‖ (p. 24). I agree with this as a description of the 
sort of reaction that they can in fact expect to receive. I even agree that they might deserve some form of blame. 
But I deny that they deserve punishment. 
 
I am not sure to what extent Sher would go along with the compromise I have offered. I doubt that he would 
accept it in its entirety. It is worth noting, though, that acceptance of it even in part would tend to undermine his 
overall project. The account that Sher proposes purports to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
epistemic component not just of culpability but of negative moral responsibility generally, and, beyond that, of 
positive moral responsibility generally, and, beyond that, of prudential responsibility, both positive and 
negative. If I am right, however, that would seem too tall an order for any account of responsibility to fill 
(unless it were riddled with disjunctive clauses). Given its correlation with the reactive attitudes, and given the 
wide range of such attitudes, responsibility is simply too fragmented a concept—too multifaceted and 
variegated—to admit of the sort of uniform, unified treatment that Sher has sought to give it. Nonetheless, his 
meticulous efforts in this regard are both instructive and illuminating, and there is much to gain from a careful 
reading of his book, which will surely and deservedly be the focus of close attention from moral philosophers 
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